Despite repeated announcements of the end of ideology and the demise of religion during the 20th century, both play a crucial role in world politics today. This disjuncture between theoretical expectations and historical developments has its roots in conventional conceptions of ideology. While the latter grasp the representative nature of ideology as an expression of historical forces and political interests, they miss its constitutive role for modern politics. Based on an analysis of its historical origins and political implications, this article develops a new conception of ideology which accounts for the resilience and historical dynamics of ideological struggle. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, I
Herr, die Not ist groß! Die ich rief, die Geister, werd ich nun nicht los. 1 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe
In Goethe's famous poem, the sorcerer's apprentice summons spirits he cannot control -and each attempt to stop them multiplies their powers. And so it appears to be with ideology and religion. Every pronouncement of the end of ideology or the demise of religion seems to breathe new life into ideological or religious struggle.
In 1960, Daniel Bell declared 'the end of ideology'. 2 In developed Western societies, he argued, social democracy had resolved the problems generated by the industrical revolution which had given rise to the great 19th century ideologies -liberalism, Marxism, conservatism -and thus removed the basis for ideological struggles.
But as soon as Bell made this announcement, the 1960s erupted into intensive ideological struggles: the civil rights movement in America, the student revolution in Europe, the Prague Spring in the Eastern Bloc, and a communist turn in national liberation movements and newly independent states in the Third World.
Despite this sobering experience, in 1998 Francis Fukuyama once more proclaimed 'the end of mankinds ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government'. 3 Like Bell, Fukuyama argued that liberalism had triumphed over its fascist and communist competitors because it was capable of resolving all 'fundamental contradictions' within societyincluding religion. 4 Again, however, this proclamation was quickly followed by the rise of explicitly antiliberal movements on the left and on the right all over the world and revealed deep divisions -'fundamental contradictions' -within core liberal states themselves.
Religion, too, defied similar predictions. While the widely influential secularization thesis held that the modernization of society would lead to the gradual demise of religion, today its revival in all parts of the world has given rise to debates about a postsecular society. 5 This liberal conception of ideology and religion as a reflection of social and political tensions destined to be resolved in the course of historical development thus repeatedly misjudged their resilience.
But realists did not fare much better. Seton-Watson held 50 years ago that world politics was driven by 'conventional state interest' and the intense ideological struggles of the interwar period were simply the result of the democratization of politics, and hence the need of professional politicians 'to explain politics in terms of simple moral issues', in a 'language easily intelligible' to the masses. 6 State interest defined in terms of power was used to explain both the Cold War and its end, with ideology playing a secondary role. 7 And yet, radical changes in the professed state interests of Britain and the United States (US) today seem to have been triggered by shifts in the dominant ideology -rather than the other way around.
In both cases, ideology and religion are thus understood as reflections or expressions of underlying historical forces and political interests.
These conceptions appear to miss, however, their role in constituting state interests and misjudge the dynamic rise, fall and revival of their historical development. Addressing these shortcomings in two steps, I will first provide an historical account of the role of ideology and religion in world politics between 1919 and 2019. It shows that while reflecting historical developments and political interests, ideology and religion also systematically constitute these forces and interests. In order to recover this constitutive dimension, I will then provide an analysis of the origins of the concept of ideology and its theoretical and political implications. Designed to justify the power of liberal forces, the concept of ideology provided a new epistemological basis for modern politics -forcing political struggle onto the ideological battlefield and (re)constituting political actors, principles, practices, and institutions, including religion. Unlike conventional approaches, the article concludes, this conception of ideology does account for its historical dynamics.
Ideological politics 1919 -2019
Ideology and religion have played a pervasive and varied role in world politics over the past 100 years. Tracing this role confirms the conventional claims that ideology and religion reflect social and political developments and serve to justify state interests. But it also shows that those developments and interests were themselves systematically constituted by ideologies and religions.
The end of the First World War ushered in a period of intense ideological struggles, reflecting, as liberals hold, tensions and contradictions within and between societies: economic and social instability, political fragmentation, tensions between colonial powers and colonized populations as well as between the winners and the losers of the war. Yet while these tensions were indeed reflected in ideological fragmentation and struggle, they were also squarely attributed to liberal domestic and international policies. And it was the opposition to liberalism that constituted, shaped and strengthened competing political ideologies.
Even before the war ended, revolution broke out in Russia and revolutionary movements and upheavals followed all over Europe as well as in Latin America, India, Indonesia, Turkey and China. 8 The rise of communist and socialist parties reflected the economic hardships following the war. But their political aim was to replace the liberal capitalist order which was held responsible for both with a communist one.
Similarly, conservative and religious forces reflected concerns about political instability and fragmentation. Blaming liberalism for these developments, they pursued the resurrection of traditional political institutions and religious moral and social values instead. Fascism, too, reflected the concerns of demobilized soldiers who saw little chance of reintegration into an economically and politically unstable society. Fiercely antiliberal and anticommunist, fascism sought to replace the fragmented liberal political order with a strong populistoften xenophobic and racist -nation. 9 Concerned with the loss of religious moral and social values, in Europe religious forces worked largely in and through conservative movements and parties. In the colonies, the suppression of these values was blamed on the liberal colonizers and religious forces contributed to broad based anti-imperialist movements seeking to establish political independence and self-determination.
While each of these political movements responded to a different problem and offered different solutions, all of them were shaped by their opposition to liberalism. And this common ground also provided the basis for temporary cooperations between otherwise radically different ideologies: between communism and fascism in Germany, between conservatism, religious forces and fascism in Spain, and between communism, conservatism, and religion in anti-imperialist movements.
These ideologies, as realists correctly argue, were used to justify particular state interests and policies. In addition, however, their models of social and political organization were based on universalist claims about the nature of society which translated into transnational and international cooperation and conflict. Communists expected the world revolution and established the Comintern in order to collaborate with (and dictate the strategies of) communist parties and movements around the world. Anti-imperialist movements, including formally independent states like China and many Latin American countries as well as African Americans, organized regular pan-African and pan-Asian conferences. 10 The right wing in the Spanish civil war received massive support from conservative and fascist movements, just as the left did from communist and socialist ones. Liberals cooperated in establishing the League of Nations, opposed communism through intervention in the Russian civil war and the propagation of national self-determination in Europe, and fought anti-imperialism in the colonies themselves as well as through the mandate system of the League of Nations.
Moreover, in many cases ideological loyalty trumped loyalty to the nation. Communist parties followed Comintern policies even if they were not in the national interest; fascists found sympathizers and (later) collaborators in other countries; 'members of each people fought on both sides'; 11 liberals refused to enter an alliance with communist Russia against Nazi Germany on ideological, not national, grounds; and even in colonies threatened by Japanese imperialism, the latter found support on account of its anti-Western nature. 12 If national interest nevertheless seemed to play a tremendously important role in these ideological struggles throughout the interwar period, it was because none of these ideologies was able to establish its hegemony beyond particular states: communists came to power in This exercise of power, however, fuelled resistance among liberals and communists who, eventually, bracketed their enmity and fought the axis powers together. Thus, it was the attempt to realize the fascist ideology internationally that led to its comprehensive defeat in the Second World War and strengthened liberalism, communism and anti-imperialism.
Ideology and religion thus pervaded world politics between 1919 and
1945. Yet, while these ideologies certainly reflected existing tensions and were used to justify state policies, such conceptions fail to account for the fact that these tensions and interests were themselves ideologically constituted. It was the liberal ideology that was held responsible for the war and its consequences and against which all other ideologies mobilized. Wherever an ideology came to power, it transformed society and the state in its own image -and thus constituted the very state interests that were subsequently justified in ideological terms. Moreover, none of these ideologies was restricted to Third World cooperation, and pushed even anti-communist regimes to ask for military aid from the USSR. 16 Ironically, the ideological approach of the USSR did not fare much better. Convinced that no country outside Europe was developed enough to undergo a socialist revolution, it failed to provide support for communist movements in the Third World and thus squandered the initial sympathies of independence movements. By the time of Stalin's death, the USSR had almost entirely lost its standing in the Third World. 17 In the Third World, meanwhile, anti-imperialist movements largely fighting against liberal colonial powers -Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the USA -initially either tended towards the left or drew on native histories and religions. Both communists and nativists, however, were interested in modernization and economic and technological advance along Western lines. Almost all their leaders were Western educated modernizers 18 trying to establish a modern nation state. Yet, in pursuit of this goal Third World leaders had to contend with the legacies of colonialism: warped domestic economies, an international economic order designed to serve the interests of the former colonial powers, rigid stratification and racism as well as borders that cut across ethnic and religious lines.
In this context, religion often played a crucial role in nation-and statebuilding policies. In some cases, like Sri Lanka, Buddhism provided the basis for nationbuilding, thus marginalizing the Hindu minority and eventually leading to a brutal 30 year civil war. In other cases, like India, it led to separation and the constitution of two independent states and ongoing conflicts between India and Pakistan.
In yet other cases like Turkey, China, or Guinea, modernizing elites viciously suppressed religion as a barrier to national integration and a modern secular state. 19 That Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a Order (NIEO). 22 After the death of Stalin, the Soviet ideology shifted away from its rigid refusal to support Third World independence movements and began to provide training, weapons and supplies. 23 And in the West itself, 1968 led to a cultural revolution highly critical of liberalism's paternalist domestic and international policies. Yet again, liberalism's largely uncontested power did not prove, as Fukuyama argued, that its 'theoretical truth is absolute and could not be improved upon'. 29 On the contrary, it was precisely the exercise of this liberal power that generated resistance and strengthened competing ideologies. The belief that now at last the liberal vision could be realized worldwide 30 Democracy promotion most commonly led to the emergence of 'illiberal' or 'authoritarian' democracies. 33 Instead of appeasing domestic conflict, the introduction of democracy in civil war situations often exacerbated it. 34 And humanitarian interventions failed to prevent massive human rights violations -for example in Somalia, Bosnia, Libya. 35 Liberal assumptions, in short, were not confirmed by these developments. 36 Crucially, however, it was the liberal belief that still-existing ideological competitors were destined for the dustbin of history and one therefore did not have to pay attention to any remaining 'crackpot messiahs' 37 -whether in Russia or the global South -that underpinned the pursuit of these liberal foreign policies with arrogance and hubris. 38 Taking stock of the role of ideology and religion in world politics over the past 100 years highlights that conventional conceptions tend to overlook their productive role: ideologies and religion produce the very tensions and contradictions they subsequently come to reflect, and they constitute the very actors, interests, and policies they subsequently justify. Most importantly, however, this failure to recognize the constitutive role of ideology and religion underpins systematic misjudgements of their historical dynamics. A more accurate assessment of the role of ideology and religion in world politics thus requires a reconceptualization that accounts not just for their representative but also for their productive functions.
Origins and logic of ideology
The concept of ideology provides an ideal starting point for the analysis of its productive functions because (unlike religion, for example) we can pinpoint its historical origins. This section thus investigates the historical origins of the concept of ideology and provides an analysis of its theoretical and political implications. research Universities -in short, the modern nation state and with it that state's national interest. And, as we have seen in the previous section, 20th century ideologies followed the same logic wherever they came to power: protecting private property or socializing it, suppressing religion or introducing religious laws, expanding citizenship rights or excluding races, sexes, religions, ethnicities. The very states whose interests Seton-Watson juxtaposed to ideology were thus themselves the product of ideology. 46 Secondly, the ideological justification of power transforms traditional political forces into ideologies and constitutes new ideologies. While political power during the ancien regime was justified with reference to the grace of God, conservatives now argued that authority and hierarchy were in line with the organic nature of society and thus called for the conservation of traditional institutions like monarchy, religion, parliamentary government and property rights. And these goals were now pursued through conservative political parties. 47 Religion, too, was fundamentally transformed in this process. By replacing religious thought as the epistemological basis of social and political power, liberal ideology separated 'lived religion as practiced by everyday individuals and groups' 48 Theoretically, the liberal model of society was based on empirical 'evidence' about the state of nature derived from indigenous societies in the context of the colonization of America. 53 And politically, these epistemological claims were used to justify liberal colonialism. Political rule, James Mill argued, had to be based on 'the most profound knowledge of the laws of human nature' and 'the most perfect comprehension of the principles of human society' -and since such knowledge was held by the British and violated by Hinduism, it was the British who had to exercise political rule in India. 54 Throughout the 19th century European imperialism was justified largely in liberal terms 55 and in the process stimulated alternative anti-imperialist ideologies in the colonies. 56 And liberal values like distrust of dictatorship, a commitment to constitutional government, the rule of law and citizenship rights as well as the belief in reason, public debate, education, science were widely taken for granted. 58 Economic interdependence and international cooperation appeared to be so successful that Norman Angell argued war had become irrational. 59 But it was precisely that power and its worldwide exercise that made war seem attractive to those who did not wield it, bringing down the first liberal world order in the trenches of the First World War. And it is the second liberal world order, arising from the end of the Cold War, that has generated the revival of communist, conservative, religious, and fascist ideologies today. And state (or other) interests can be contrasted with ideological justifications only if they are not themselves the product of ideological politics. In fact, however, the revival of antiliberal ideologies today is the product of the liberal world order.
Conclusion
Liberalism is thus quite literally the mother of all ideologies. But having unleashed the spirit of ideological politics, the latter develops in accordance with its own internal logic. Not only has liberalism, like the sorcerer's apprentice, lost control of its own creation; every attempt to stop it provides fuel for competing ideologies. 
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